PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Chinese University of Hong Kong; date: 13 June 2016 a sexuality, an age, a collection of abilities and disabilities, and more. Many feminists have argued that the social forces that form us, and their effects, cannot be decomposed into discrete elements (Lugones and Spelman 1983; Spelman 1988; Crenshaw 1989; Harris 1990) . Is it possible to give a unified account of gender or race, while still affirming the interdependence and experiential blending of an individual's lived social positions? Can we assume that terms such as 'woman' or 'race' have determinate meanings? If not, how should we proceed-politically and theoretically? What is the best methodology for theorizing about social categories? What determines the meaning(s) of contested terms?
Even these quick examples demonstrate that topics in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of language are not far below the surface of debates over social construction: My overall strategy is to distinguish several different ways in which things are "socially constructed." For example, consider a simplified account of the construction of race or gender: to be a member of the subordinate group in question is to be viewed and treated in a certain way by the dominant group (and usually others). Members of the subordinate groups typically internalize and eventually come to resemble and even reinforce the dominant's image because of the coercive power behind it. Thus the dominants' view appears to be confirmed, when in fact they simply have the power to enforce it.
There are several different elements of this picture that could qualify as social constructions, for example, the dominant group's (mistaken) view of the subordinate; each group's selfunderstandings; the lived (economic, political) divisions between the groups; the group classification system; and even members of the groups themselves. In understanding these different phenomena, we are sometimes concerned with unmasking illusions that are projected onto groups: attention PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Chinese University of Hong Kong; date: 13 June 2016 to the illusions is one source of the suspicion that social constructions aren't "real." In other cases we are concerned to emphasize that the causes of apparent group differences are at least mediated by social forces: attention to the profound effects of the social is one source of suspicion of the "natural." And accounts of this sort supplement individualistic explanations of behavior with explanations that emphasize the impact of social structures. Although post-structuralism and post-modernism have taught us to be wary of "totalizing" structural explanations, we cannot avoid talking about practices and institutions and local structures if we are to understand group oppression.
In this book, I aim to provide accounts of race and gender that clarify the sites and forms of construction involved, and that can also be fruitfully employed in the quest for social justice. In particular, I am interested in certain forms of oppression that are read into, marked upon, and lived through the body. The process of marking groups and naturalizing their subordination is an element in virtually all oppression, yet the form and degree of bodily involvement varies. The markers of race and gender, like the markers of disability and age, are not accessories that might be added or dropped, habits to be taught or broken; they are parts of our bodies and "as-if" indelible. Although other forms of oppression may be equally lasting, and may be more severe, it is both analytically and politically valuable to have a framework within which we can explore contemporary forms of embodied oppression (see also Alcoff 2006) . In this project I focus on only two dimensions of embodiment: race and gender; this is not to suggest that they are the most important or that a full account can be achieved without looking at other dimensions as well. Rather, this is just where I begin. My hope is that the tools I provide in exploring these dimensions will be helpful in studying others.
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For my purposes, the core phenomenon is the pattern of social relations that constitute men as dominant and women as subordinate, of Whites as dominant and people of color as subordinate. An account of how norms, symbols, identities, and such are gendered or raced is then given by reference to the "core" sense.
My accounts focus on the social relations constituting gender and race, because these relations are an important site of injustice. As a result, on my account, neither gender nor race is an intrinsic feature of bodies, even though the markers of gender and race typically are. To have a race is not to have a certain appearance or ancestry, and to have a gender is not to have a certain reproductive anatomy. I embrace the feminist slogan that gender is the social meaning of sex and extend this by arguing that race is the social meaning of "color." To avoid confusion, I use the terms 'woman' and 'man' to refer to genders and 'male' and 'female' to sexes, 'Black' and 'White' (upper case) to refer to races and 'black' and 'white' (lower case) to refer to "colors."
4 Sex and "color" have social meaning to the extent that the interpretation of someone as male or female, white or asian, has implications for their social position: the roles they are expected to play in the social context, the norms in terms of which they will be evaluated, the identities they are expected to have, and the like. Such implications are easily demonstrated, hence, on my view, gender and race are real. However, their reality in the contemporary context is the product of unjust social structures, and so should be resisted.
I have found it useful to present the idea of a focal analysis by using a pair of overlapping diagrams: To capture the specificity of the social position of an individual, it would be a mistake, of course, to consider just gender or just race. I suggest that we can gain insight into the phenomenon of intersectionality by (roughly) superimposing the diagrams offered in figures 0.1 and 0.2. Imagine race, gender, and other social positions to be like gels on a stage light: the light shines blue and a red gel is added, and the light shines purple; if a yellow gel is added instead of the red, the light shines green. Similarly, gender is lived differently depending on the racial (and other) positions in which one is situated. Just as a light may appear different colors depending on which combination of gels it is filtered through, the gender norms for Black women, Latinas, and White women differ tremendously, and even among women of the same race, they differ depending on class, nationality, sexuality, religion, historical period, and so on. However, just as we can gain understanding of the green light on the stage by learning it is created by a combination of blue and yellow gels, and can adjust the light by manipulating the gels, the hope is that we can gain understanding of the lived experience of those who are gendered and raced by having the analytical tools to distinguish them. (Sewell 1992) . We must be attentive simultaneously to both agents and structures.
Second, although in understanding agents we must do justice to experience, we must also be aware that we are bodies, and in the practices of day-to-day life, the movement, location, and meaning of our bodies often has little to do with the agent's consciousness or intentions. As a result, it must be a nontrivial part of feminist and antiracist efforts, not just to change minds, but also to retrain bodies, and not just to retrain bodies, but to change the material conditions that our bodies encounter on a daily basis.
And third, in understanding structures we must be sensitive to the interplay between material and cultural dimensions of social life (Young 1980) . In interdisciplinary feminist studies, scholars have learned to play close attention to the complex relationship between representations and the material reality of the social world. Both ordinary narratives and "scientific" theories sustain structures of power; unjust allocations of resources appear to provide evidence for certain cultural myths. Dialogue across disciplines has urged humanists to consider the material circumstances that condition representation, and has led social scientists to recognize the complex ways that institutions are interpreted, reinterpreted, and resisted by the agents within them. Social theory, as I Many of the essays in this collection consider these issues of meaning indirectly, and a few more directly. On my view, there is not a sharp line between ordinary language and theory, and it would be a mistake to treat the terms in question as ambiguous. My approach to meaning is influenced by three broad movements in contemporary analytic philosophy: naturalism, scientific essentialism, and semantic externalism. Books have been written on each, and anything I say here, or in the chapters that follow, will barely scratch the surface. However, I will say a bit about each to give some background context relevant to my project and then explain why I believe that these movements are more friendly to the project of critical social theory than is sometimes supposed. The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. In our hands it develops and changes, through more or less arbitrary and deliberate revisions and additions of our own, more or less directly occasioned by the continuing stimulation of our sense organs. It is a pale gray lore, black with fact and white with convention. But I have found no substantial reasons for concluding that there are any quite black threads in it, or any white ones. (Quine 1976, 132) Nor is there a sharp line between science, philosophy, and ordinary efforts to make sense of the world:
… my position is a naturalistic one: I see philosophy not
as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat-a boat which, to (p.14)
revert to Neurath's figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere. (Quine 1969, 126- Although Quine himself was skeptical of "meanings," semantic externalists such as Putnam, Kripke (1980) , and Burge (1979) embraced his naturalizing impulse and proposed that the meaning of a term is its referent, and determining what the meaning is requires empirical inquiry. Although the ordinary person may use words meaningfully to refer to things having in mind only a vague, non-individuating, or even mistaken description of them, the meaning is not, correspondingly, vague or incomplete. This is because, as Putnam put it, "'meanings' just ain't in the head!" (Putnam 1973, 704 In a sense, we could say that social theory arises when we try to formulate explicitly what we are doing, describe the activity which is central to a practice, and articulate the norms which are essential to it…. But in fact the framing of theory rarely consists simply of making some continuing practice explicit. The stronger motive for making and adopting theories is the sense that our implicit understanding is in some way crucially inadequate or even wrong. Theories do not just make our constitutive self-understandings explicit, but extend, or criticize, or even challenge them. (Taylor 1985, 93-4) The theorist who studies a social practice (or whatever) is not talking about something wholly new. It is the same practice that we've been talking about and engaging in all along, but without a clear understanding. The social theorist undertakes to place the practice within a larger social matrix. Taylor suggests that in some cases the theorist … alters or even overturns our ordinary everyday understanding, on the grounds that our action takes place in an unperceived causal context, (p.16) and that this gives it a quite different nature. But there are also theories which challenge ordinary self-understanding and claim that our actions have a significance we do not recognize. But this is not in virtue of an unperceived causal context, but because of what one could call a moral context to which we are allegedly blind. (Taylor 1985, 95) The failure of understanding that the social theorist aims to correct is not a lack that only some of us have; it comes with being an ordinary agent living in a culture whose practices we engage in, often "unthinkingly," just as we speak our native language. Broader causal and moral reflection on the practice, however, may reveal it to be quite different from what we might have imagined, or even what we thought pretheoretically. This is potentially a crucial moment of demystification, and, as I see it, calls for an approach to language that allows radical revisions to our ordinary understandings of what we are talking about, based on a broad-based inquiry. In short, social theory needs, at least, In my experience, philosophers tend to neglect the first step. In some cases they miss the social level of analysis completely (focusing instead on the individual or the state); in other cases they note it, but are insensitive to the challenges of describing it well or aptly. (This latter weakness may be exacerbated by the assumption that fact and value should be kept separate, so description must be value-neutral and normative concepts only become relevant once description is done and evaluation begins.) Non-philosophers, in contrast, tend to neglect the second step. Although they are committed to social justice and skilled at describing the social world in ways that reveal its tensions and constraints, they are uncomfortable in the face of moral disagreement or disagreement about values, and are unfamiliar with the resources of moral and political theory, both (p.17) normative and meta-normative. 5 As a result, they are often wary of outright normative vocabulary and prefer more implicit evaluative judgments that avoid theoretical scrutiny.
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As I see it, the two steps are deeply interdependent: in order to describe the world in a way that is apt for moral evaluation, one must have an appreciation of the multiple dimensions of moral value and adequate language to describe features that The term 'ideology' has a long and complicated history and in recent years some have rejected the concept of ideology in favor of the notion of 'discourse' (Hoy 2004) . However, I have chosen to stick with a rather broad notion of ideology that plausibly captures the less controversial core of both notions. Alan Hunt and Trevor Purvis argue, for example:
… ideology and discourse refer to pretty much the same aspect of social life-the idea that human individuals participate in forms of understanding, comprehension or consciousness of the relations and activities in which they are involved…. This consciousness is borne through language and other systems of signs, it is transmitted between people and institutions and, perhaps most important of all, it makes a difference; that is, the way in which people comprehend and make sense of the social world has consequences for the direction and character of their action and inaction. Both 'discourse' and 'ideology' refer to these aspects of social life. (Purvis and Hunt 1993, 474; see also McCarthy 1990, 440) Although from this quote it might appear that ideology is always conscious and intentional, on my view, ideology includes habits of thought, unconscious patterns of response, and inarticulate background assumptions (see also Taylor 1985, chap. 1, esp. pp. 36, 46, 54; Althusser 1970 Althusser /2001 . In this regard my own use of the term is probably closer to Bourdieu's (1977) notion of habitus than either a Marxian concept of 'ideology' or a Foucauldian notion of 'discourse' (Foucault 1982 One crucial task of ideology critique is to reveal ideology as such. In some cases this will involve calling attention to aspects of the discursive frameworks that we consciously employ, their history, and their relation to the practices and institutions they underwrite. This is sometimes called genealogy. 8 In other cases, however, ideology is invisible to us, that is, it is hegemonic, and it is necessary to articulate it and make it accessible for critical reflection. Questions of aptness or justice don't arise for what is taken for granted. However, once articulated, ideology can (in principle) be debated and reformed. So one goal of ideology critique is to elucidate the conceptual and narrative frameworks that undergird our social interaction, thus making them available for critical examination.
In some cases, ideology critique can succeed in its critical task simply through redescription; once the social phenomenon in question is seen anew, it is clear that it is problematic, even immoral. The problem might have been simply that the previous description of the phenomenon did not adequately capture the morally relevant features, or that the descriptive tools we employed were not well-suited to the evaluative tools we were attempting to apply. In these cases, the burden of argument lies in the reinterpretation of the phenomenon, not in moral theory per se. For example, once we recognize that non-consensual sex in marriage is rape, or that domestic violence is assault, we don't need an elaborate moral theory to tell us that we should change our evaluation of it from In saying that social structures are hard to notice, I'm not suggesting that people are unaware of the social practices in which they engage. Food, family, and work are a huge part of everyday life (though notably not a huge part of philosophical inquiry), and people are well aware of that. What is hard to notice-and sometimes even grasp-are the structural features of everyday practices and the interconnections between them. For example, food choices are related not only to health, cultural tradition, money, and lifestyle, but also the growth of agribusiness, global food security, animal well-being, environmental degradation, and economic exploitation (Roberts 2008) . At this point in time, the moral questions we need to ask about food concern its place in a broad social structure with complex causes and effects. This echoes Taylor's point in the quote above: the social theorist's task is to situate a practice within a broader causal and moral context that those engaged in the practice ordinarily aren't aware of.
But what is a social structure? I discuss this question at length in some of the chapters that follow, but very briefly, on my view, a social structure is a set of interdependent practices.
Practices, in turn, are shared dispositions (schemas) to respond to certain parts of the world (resources); some of these dispositions are encoded as beliefs and other attitudes, but some are merely habitual responses (Sewell 1992 approaches that obfuscated or rationalized those relations. (Fraser 1989, 113) Critical theories arise out of social activism. The questions they ask are those that are important for bringing about social justice in a particular time and place. They do not begin by asking what justice is, in the abstract, and, unless it (p.23) is important for the purposes of the movement, attempt to provide a universal account of justice. Often a universal account of justice isn't necessary to improve the situation, for the activism is a response to a situation that is straightforwardly unjust. Alternatively, the situation may not appear obviously unjust, but the challenge is then to reframe it so the injustice becomes salient. In such cases, the theoretical task is to demystify the situation to reveal what is easily acknowledged to be unjust. The task is to turn a complaint into a critique.
In keeping with the embeddedness of critical theory, feminist social critique need not attempt to argue that a social practice is sexist or racist from a starting point that all rational inquirers must endorse. It is assumed that not all rational inquirers have the understanding or the values that constitute a feminist outlook, though perhaps they could and should. The first goal is to find or construct the conceptual and evaluative frameworks that do justice to the phenomena that are the source of complaint, the phenomena that give rise to the movement. Of course there will be political and practical questions about how to use critical frameworks to promote social justice; appropriating the rhetoric of the dominant discourse may sometimes be politically necessary. But the demystification that comes from ideology critique reveals the need for, and often promising directions for, social change.
Critical theory, like all good theories, aims to be empirically adequate. However, as just indicated, it also has a practical aim: it should be helpful to those committed to furthering the aims of social justice through the movement in question, for example, the feminist and/or antiracist movement. This is not as radical as it might sound. Theories offer a response to the needs present in a social context; among other things, they offer a framework of concepts for understanding a domain. Consider, for example, medicine, engineering, economics. In addition to allowing us to make true, or empirically adequate, statements, the point of the theory is to provide resources that can inform us as we navigate the world. The framework of concepts serves as a tool. This means that justified truth is not enough; practical significance is an additional condition of success. So a critical theory, like other theories, should be judged according to several criteria: (1) Does it meet ordinary epistemic standards of empirical adequacy, consistency, and the like? (2) Are its concepts apt? Do they reveal the phenomenon in a way that helps us provide an answer to our guiding questions? (3) Does it function as part of a larger picture that enables us to address our practical concerns? (see also (Anderson 1995a) ). The point of theory in such cases is not to convince someone that there is a problem, or to prove to an unbeliever that a particular belief is the only rational option, but to answer a question, to address a concern.
To say that critical theory is epistemically (as well as politically) situated, is not to reject the goal of objective inquiry (Anderson 1995a; Anderson 1995b; Anderson 2011 ).
Once we acknowledge that the questions we ask arise out of a (p.24) particular social-historical context and that we draw on familiar assumptions and metaphors as sources of intelligibility, then it is only reasonable to be alert to the potential distortions as well as the glimpses of truth our epistemic position affords. In fact, one might argue that any plausible empiricism has to take into account the situatedness of knowing in order to address the potential for bias: the idea that multiple observers of a phenomenon are desirable in order to increase objectivity is itself an acknowledgement of the situatedness of perception and cognition. The task is not, I believe, to aim for objectivity by repositioning oneself as an abstract subject, suspending all "subjective" beliefs and values. We need not view the philosopher as a "neutral" observer of a realm of concepts. Instead, we can embrace the limitations and opportunities of our position and to undertake self-consciously situated inquiry, that is, inquiry that arises from and speaks to social conditions at a particular historical moment.
PRINTED 'Situated knowledge' is a term that one often finds associated with standpoint epistemology (Hartsock 1983) . Standpoint epistemology is a cluster of views according to which a socially situated perspective is granted epistemic privilege or authority with respect to a particular domain; feminist standpoint theories, in particular, typically grant such privilege to members of subordinated groups. Usually the privilege in question is granted over the domain of social relations that oppress them. A commitment to situated knowers is, however, a weaker commitment than a commitment to standpoint epistemology. To claim that knowers are situated is to claim that what we believe or understand about something is affected by how we are related to it. This is consistent with themes already discussed: if being a member of a certain social category brings with it pressure to learn the practices and internalize the norms and expectations of that category, it is not surprising that this process would reveal some phenomena and obscure others, depending on the social position one occupies. A commitment to situated inquiry does not commit one to privileging any particular perspective or to the idea that one is unable to "step outside" one's particular perspective.
But, one might ask, how does it help to say that feminist social critique or antiracist social critique begins with the commitments and projects of feminism and must be evaluated relative to that domain? It would seem that either there is a single "approved" feminist viewpoint that offers social criticism but few will endorse it (since so few occupy the "approved" feminist viewpoint); or there are multiple feminist viewpoints and there are multiple critiques, but no coherence and so little power in the account.
These are real concerns, but they are concerns for virtually any disciplined inquiry in which there is disagreement about the subject matter, the methods, or the precise standards for acceptability. There is always a trade-off between the breadth of the target audience for an argument and the strength of its conclusions. Moreover, the fact of disagreement does not undermine a theoretical (p.25) endeavor, but potentially strengthens it. However, the multiplicity of feminist And is it meaningful to use the term 'feminist theory'? Second, if feminist critical theory is situated, as suggested, and looks to those in subordinate positions for insight into the practices and structures they enact, how can the theory challenge or demystify the dominant understanding of the practices? The majority will plausibly reflect back to the theorist the dominant understandings and reject critical reframings. Must it rely on "experts" or "theorists" as authorities to validate its claims? Is ideology critique, then, inevitably epistemically (and politically) elitist?
Let me say something brief about each of these issues in turn.
As I see it, feminist critical theory does not offer a broad overarching "theory" or utopian vision that can be applied across the board. As I mentioned before, critical theory is not primarily in the business of constructing normative theories from scratch, but of exploring the opportunities within and limits of existing normative and descriptive frameworks. Even if there were rational consensus on a single universal theory of justice, the job for critical theorists would be to engage in critique of its conceptual and narrative presuppositions. As Anderson described above, the result of critique would not necessarily be a rejection of the theory's principles and frameworks; critique might yield reflectively endorsement of them as tools in the work for justice. What feminist critical theory does offer is a range of strategies, priorities, and tools for doing both institutional and ideology critique. Some of these may be very abstract and useful in many contexts; others may be only locally useful. But it is not necessary to develop a single coherent position in order to promote social justice. There are many very different ways for women and members of other subordinated groups to flourish. Reason is the power to change our attitudes, intentions, and practices in response to reflection on the merits of having them or engaging in them…. reflective endorsement is the only test for whether a consideration counts as a reason for having any attitude or engaging in any practice of inquiry: we ask: on reflecting on the ways the consideration could or does influence our attitudes and practices and the implications of its influencing us, whether we can endorse its influencing us in those ways. If we can reflectively endorse its influence, we count the consideration as a reason for our attitudes or practices. (Anderson 1995b, 53) Ideology critique invites us to withhold reflective endorsement from our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking to consider whether and how they guide our participation in unjust structures; critique gives us alternatives to explore. It does not follow from our shared capacities for reasoned reflection that feminists will all agree, or that any critical theorist will find universal (or even broad) endorsement of the revisionary But even if critical theorists cannot gain the endorsement of everyone subordinated by the institutions and practices they critique, a crucial feature of critical theory is that it supposed to make a difference. In its early forms, the idea was that critical theories are "inherently emancipatory" (Geuss 1981, 2) . I've articulated a much weaker form of this criterion, suggesting that a critical theory must be judged, in part, by its practical pay-off. It must be useful to the movement. Is this a reasonable basis for evaluation?
One way of developing this idea would be to claim that a critique is acceptable only when it can gain a foothold among those adversely affected by the practice or structure being criticized; in other words, it is a necessary condition on acceptable critique that the subordinated and their allies find it illuminating or useful, that it contributes to their quest for social justice. 10 This condition would (p.27) be both a strength and a weakness: on one hand, it is easy to imagine that there are unjust social structures that are so ingrained that few directly affected can recognize their harm. Shouldn't we count a critique that demonstrates the injustice of those structures as acceptable, nevertheless? On the other hand, if the success of a social critique depends on the reflective responses and choices of those affected, we build respect for their autonomy into the practice of critique. Acceptable feminist social critique, on this view, must be meaningful to the women in whose name it speaks. This is not to say that it must be compatible with everything women say or desire, but that social critique is an adequate tool in a context only if it can reach those whose complaint it allegedly articulates. (Anderson 1995a, 53) . She continues by providing some examples:
• "The theory, although it asserts nothing but truths, may be trivial, insignificant or beside the point: it doesn't address the contextual interests motivating the question."
(p.28) • The theory "may be biased: it offers an incomplete account, one that pays disproportionate attention to those pieces of significant evidence that incline towards one answer, ignoring significant facts that support rival answers."
• "The theory may be objectionable for trying to answer a question that has illegitimate normative presuppositions."
• separated or exclude phenomena that should be included in a class."
• The theory may employ a classification "based on illegitimate contextual values and for that reason should be rejected altogether."
• The theory may rely on "methods that foreclose the possibility of discovering that we have certain valuable potentialities or that certain important differences or similarities exist among the subjects being studied" (Anderson 1995a, 53-4 There are at least two ways that a critical theory might be acceptable in Anderson's sense and still, in some sense, fail.
On one hand, the failure might be purely political: the theory gains reflective endorsement by a significant number of those who have the opportunity to consider it fairly, but it doesn't help the cause for any number of practical reasons; an extreme version could be that the leaders of the movement are killed or imprisoned. On the other hand, the failure might be more epistemic: the theory does not receive reflective endorsement even after opportunities for reflection have been offered. Those who ask the question motivating the inquiry just don't find it illuminating. This suggests that the theory is missing a bridge that allows a shift from seeing the world in one way, to seeing it in another. This "bridge," however, may not be simply a matter of ideas. Charles Taylor suggests:
… we have great difficulty grasping definitions whose terms structure the world in ways which are utterly sharpen one's intuitions, it may be that one has to change one's orientation-if not in adopting another orientation, at least in living one's own in a way which allows for greater comprehension of others. Thus … there can be a valid response to 'I don't understand' which takes the form, not only 'develop your intuitions,' but more radically 'change yourself.' (Taylor 1985, 54) This suggests that critique may fail to garner broad endorsement not because the theory itself is unacceptable or because the inquirers are epistemically at fault, but because the social context does not provide for ways of being that are necessary in order to find value in the critique. Social critique is a process of rethinking the practices that we constitute partly through our thinking, of trying out new responses to the world in place of the old responses that have come to seem problematic. The task is to situate ourselves differently in the world, not just to describe it more accurately. Although we can go some way in this direction by thinking and acting in new ways, social conditions may make it rational for one to resist such change (Cudd 2006 (Wendell 1996) , the American diet (Roberts 2009; Pollan 2008) , consumerism (Schor 1999 militarism (Enloe 2007) , orientalism (Said 1978) , the social contract (Mills 1997; Mills and Pateman 2007) , race (Appiah 1996) , gender (Butler 1990 The title of the book, Resisting Reality, is intentionally ambiguous. On one hand, it reflects a common resistance to recognizing the reality of the social (p.30) world and the tendency of theorists, in particular, to opt for an anti-realist approach to social categories such as race. I reject this approach and argue throughout for the reality of social structures and the political importance of recognizing this reality. On the other hand, given that much of the (very real) social world consists of unjust social structures, I think this reality must be resisted. Another theme in the book is that one of the main goals of social constructionism is to lay bare the mechanisms by which social structures are formed and sustained so that we are better positioned to locate the levers for social change. We should not resist seeing the reality that we should, in fact, resist; in fact, disclosing that reality is a crucial precondition for successful resistance.
Originally I intended this book to be a monograph developing an overarching argument. It now seems best to publish it as a collection of essays with closely interconnected themes. Part of what made a monograph difficult was the issue of audience. I have had in mind multiple audiences to whom different parts of the book speak more or less directly: students interested in social theory, feminists and anti-racists in a broad range of disciplines, analytic philosophers, legal theorists and policy be a medical man is to be XY, to be a medical knife is to be of the sort used by a man who is XY (1236a15-22) ." I differ from many using the concept by emphasizing that the core or focal meaning may differ depending on one's theoretical purposes.
(4) I discuss the distinctions between sex and gender, "color"
and race extensively in Chapter 6. Note that "color" (with scare quotes) on my view is not just skin color, but any socially meaningful features taken in a context as (alleged) indicators of ancestral links to a particular geographical region.
(5) Although I use 'they' to refer to both groups, I find myself situated, sometimes in one, other times in the other, with all their strengths and weaknesses.
(6) The histories of the disciplines make sense of these tendencies: social scientists are "scientists" so their research
should be "objective" in the sense of value neutral; philosophers are not "scientists" and their realm of expertise is normative inquiry, so they should leave the description to the scientists (or common sense).
(7) Miranda Fricker (2007) introduces the term 'hermeneutic disablement' and discusses the kinds of epistemic and political injustice that arise when our concepts fail us. Such circumstances call for ideology critique.
(8) I discuss one approach to genealogy in this volume, Chapter 13.
(9) A careful reader will note that I never define the term 'social,' here or in the essays that follow. This is not an accident. I believe that it is not possible to define 'social' in non-circular terms, so an analysis, strictly speaking, is not possible. This does not rule out giving an account of the social, but the contours of this, like those of any account, will depend on the particular project, the purposes for which one needs a notion of the social, and so on My approach to this, as in other cases, is to employ a focal analysis. For my purposes, coordinated activity is the focal notion. Social relations are those that constitute and support the coordination, and social groups consist of those standing in these relations. This approach allows for forms of sociality that are quite demanding (Margaret Gilbert's excellent work (e.g., Gilbert 1989) on activities such as taking a walk together would be included), social-structural groups that are social groups in a more attenuated sense (Young 2000) , and even the sociality of bees and flocks of geese.
(10) Taylor suggests something along the lines I'm suggesting: "Put tersely, our social theories can be validated, because they can be tested in practice. If theory can transform practice, then it can be tested in the quality of the practice it informs.
What makes a theory right is that it brings practice out in the clear; that its adoption makes possible what is in some sense a more effective practice" (Taylor 1985, 104) .
(11) Another, perhaps better, option would be to claim that a critique is satisfactory if it could be effective, should more accept it (assuming also that its claims are well-justified and its concepts apt), but unless it is useful to those needing it, it is not fully successful (because it doesn't have the practical import that successful critique must have).
(12) Thanks to Kate Manne for pointing out how having our attitudes attuned to the injustice around us is valuable even if there is little hope for change.
